Inevitability of dictators

The 21st century has given rise to the whole galaxy of dictators in economically and politically developed
countries, therefore, the situation in the world is gradually becoming a mirror image of the 20th century’s
corresponding period.
Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Salazar, the emperor of Japan -- all the dictators of the last century can
be embodied by their successors in today's world who are their copies with one or another reservation.
If we analyze the current situation and the further development of events, we come to an understanding
where the presence of a few powerful people, the “smartest, brightest, and wisest” fathers of nations, will
go in the future.
There are at least a few historical patterns:
- a few dictators did not spell rivers of blood within the country;
- almost all the dictators waged wars, and the more powerful the dictator’s country is, the greater is the
number of war-related victims;
- a dictator received a real gain by satisfying his ambitions, obviously, if he remained alive, a handful of
his manipulators won under either outcome.
The result of comparing the development of societies head by a dictator and without him is clearly not in
favor of the first option.
The reasons for dictators’ coming to power and their consolidation aren’t studied systematically,
however, the certain Nobel laureates addressed to some points in their researches.
The most famous research works, concerning this topic directly, are the works of Kenneth Joseph Arrow
on the “inevitability of dictator”
and George Akerlof on the adverse selection. Precise enough for the
simple situations stimulation, including public choice as well, the theorem of John Forbes Nash on the
equilibria in non-cooperative games and the prisoners dilemma formulated by Merrill Flood and Melvin
Dresher
, clearly indicate the ways to achieve the Pareto optimality states.
It wouldn’t be hard for a person with basic knowledge of mathematics to justify the configuration of the
social structure, the basic rules of a public choice and its periodicity, excluding the coming to power of
the dictator based on the above-mentioned works:

  • “the inevitable choice of the dictator of the social welfare function” under an ordinal utility approach to the voting process set out in the Nobel work of Kenneth Joseph Arrow, indicates a party or other corporatization’s influence and the imposition of the ordinal election assessments configuration by a party-corporate dictator to voters. In other words: we as voters will choose a “dictator” anyway! And since we can’t actually rank a candidate quantitatively, we use an ordinal approach according to the preferences imposed by the corrupted mass-media on us. For example, what will you choose: a pear, banana, or grapes (the answer is at the end of the article)? To exclude the dictator’s election, we should “fragment the dictator” by structuring the elections of local “dictators” according to the public service functions or, in other words, by changing the electoral system in favor of the direct elections, “inevitable” according to Arrow, “dictators” of the main state functions: constitutional review; executive power in the areas of the basic functions, prosecution services at all levels, from the Attorney-General to regional and local prosecutors; courts of all instances; local authorities from the General Coordinators to the heads of the sectors (education, health care, police, local resources and budget management), elections’ supervision and organization.

 

  • the conclusions of George Akerlof’s Nobel work clearly indicate the ways of eliminating the deteriorating selection of social systems by including temporal feedback that excludes information asymmetry in the systems. In the problem statement of excluding the election of a global dictator (for example, in a country), the elected “local dictator” of the main social welfare functions should have the shortest “judgment-free” period of the authority.

 

  • the elimination of a global dictator’s election (in the context of a country) will manifest itself in a prisoners dilemma if direct elections of “local dictators” of the main state functions are held, consequently, the time required for reaching the Nash equilibrium for a collusion among “local dictators” of public welfare functions will increase significantly. “Local dictators” will be forced to solve another “prisoner problem” in the interests of their employer -- the Voters, where the criterion of the “crime” selected to perform certain functions of a country is a deviation from the Pareto optimality. In addition, it has been experimentally proved that when a game is expanded to ten or more stages, players are no longer able to use the appropriate algorithms and continue the game with equilibrium strategies. “Local dictators” will be forced to criticize each other and fulfill their functions in Pareto-optimality. And with a reduction of the “judgment-free” authority period, they will have to make it more intense.

Conclusion:

The election of the administrative state structures representatives will inevitably lead to the election of the
dictator of the function of public welfare. You will elect the dictator anyway whether it is an individual or
a party with a leader, and nobody can argue with that (if only someone can refute the Kenneth Joseph
Arrow’s Nobel work). The fragmentation of the state’s governing functions will lead to the emergence of
numerous local dictators, where no one could become a leader due to the practical impossibility of the
opportunistic agreements under the conditions:

  • fragmentation of functions on more than ten;
  • introduction of a limited term of office, to exclude the “pre-election information” asymmetry (populist promises) and ranking of the elected candidates;
  • introduction of the direct elections, as an achievement of the Pareto-optimum of the fragmented state’s governing functions of social welfare. In this case, each local dictator has to find a balance with the voters, and not with the groups that have empowered him.

With the above changes, it would make little sense for the oligarchs, parties, or financial groups to bribe
directly elected “local dictators” of the social welfare functions. Not only the costliness but also the
divergence of interests, non-reelection, lack of time for collusion and possible cover-ups (the most
common phenomenon of modern state-level systems) will be crucial for the elimination of political and
economic corruption in many countries.
The most important factor is the very definition of the basic public administration functions owing to the
historical traditions of different countries.


The configuration of the state, excluding the dictator, may look as follows:
Direct elections of the central government:

  • The term of office for up to 3 years
  • President with the Constitution supervision functions
  • Supreme Commander
  • The term of office between 1 and 2 years:
  • Chief Justice and members of the Court
  • General Procurator and panel members
  • Director of the intelligence agency
  • Director of Anti-Corruption Office
  • Director of Special Prosecution Office
  • Director of Bureau of Investigation
  • Prime Minister
  • Minister of Finance
  • Minister of Health
  • Minister of Police
  • Minister of Education
  • Directors of Central Election Commission
  • Legislature members
  • Director of the Central Bank
  • Director of competition authority
  • Director of public media
  • Direct elections of the regional government:
  • The term of office between 1 and 2 years:
  • Governor
  • Judges
  • Prosecutors
  • Regional legislative authorities:
  • Chief of Police
  • Chief of the Health Section
  • Chief of the Education Section
  • Chief of public property management
  • Chief of land management
  • Chief of Electoral Commission
  • Chief of public media

Direct elections of the local government:

  • The term of office between 1 and 2 years
  • Mayors or community leaders
  • Prosecutors
  • Judges
  • Members of the Executive
  • Trustee of health-care
  • Trustee of education
  • Public property manager
  • Land manager
  • Electoral Commission manager
  • Public media manager

The proposed configuration of the social structure, basic rules of a public choice and its frequency do not
contradict the basic Constitutions of the democratic countries, the ONU and EU Charters on Human
Rights.
In economically developed countries, parts of the above-mentioned configuration were implemented
historically and intuitively, and its further introduction (or, taking into account the historical features, its
semantic modification) would exclude the appearance of global dictators.
P.S. Why to choose is forced on you if you like apples?
In this context, it is important to get the complete list, without limiting the options.
Politicians claim that you have elected prosecutors, judges, central civil servants via intermediaries
(deputies, president, coalition). The elected ones do not owe to you, therefore, they work only for those
who really elected them.

Links:

https://bigpicture.ru/?p=223412

https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Теорема_Эрроу

http://econbooks.ru/books/part/18897

https://m.studme.org/53142/politekonomiya/ordinalistskiy_podhod_suschnost_instrumenty_analiza

https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Асимметричность_информации

https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Равновесие_Нэша

https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дилемма_заключённого

https://inosmi.ru/science/20180418/242015801.html

 

Date: 12 февраля 2019

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